See also Strict liability (intervening acts), Negligence (independent intervening acts), and Intervening cause.
With respect to superseding intervening causes that might break the chain of proximate causation, the rule is established that it is not necessary that tortfeasors or concurrent forces act in concert, or that there be a joint operation or a union of act or intent, in order for the negligence of each to be regarded as the proximate cause of the injuries, thereby rendering all tortfeasors liable. See Cartwright v. Graves, 182 Tenn. 114, 184 S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tenn. 1944); Whitehurst v. Howell, 20 Tenn.App. 314, 98 S.W.2d 1071, 1081 (Tenn. 1936); Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn. App. 577, 218 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tenn. App. 1949).
There is no requirement that a cause, to be regarded as the proximate cause of an injury, be the sole cause, the last act, or the one nearest to the injury, provided it is a substantial factor in producing the end result. Lancaster at 221; Kroger Co. at 626; Roberts at 871.
An intervening act, which is a normal response created by negligence, is not a superseding, intervening cause so as to relieve the original ...