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It is not at all unusual for the Supreme Court to conclude that the literal text of a criminal statute is broader than the coverage intended by Congress. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 619 (1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1994) (departing from “most natural grammatical reading” of statute because of “anomalies which result from this construction,” and presumptions with respect to scienter in criminal statutes and avoiding constitutional questions); id., at 81 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (stating that lower court interpretation of statute rejected by the Court was “quite obviously the only grammatical reading”); Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982) (holding that statute prohibiting the making of false statements to a bank was inapplicable to depositing of a “bad check” because “the Government's interpretation . . . would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law”); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) (“We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting [a Prohibition Act] statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation ...
