Promises made directly to a creditor to answer for the debt of another must be in writing. The promise must regard a contract that existed prior to the surety's promise.
The rule is fully established that one who merely calls a physician to render services to another is not liable therefor in the absence of an express agreement, unless he is legally bound to furnish such service, or it is a fair inference from the evidence that it was the intention of both parties that he should pay for it. But if the defendant said to the plaintiff, 'I want my father taken care of, and give him the best care you can give him, and what the charges are * * * I will pay for it.' It shows that the defendant not only requested the services, but also that she made a direct promise to pay the plaintiff. Such a promise is not collateral or secondary, but primary and original. It comes within the law as laid down in Pocket v. Almon, 90 Vt. 10, 96 A. 421, and Enos v. Owens Slate Co., 104 Vt. 329, 160 A. 185. To such a contract ...