Plea negotiations are generally governed by the principles of contract law. Plea agreements are subject to traditional principles of contract law absent such concerns. See [People v.] Evans, 174 Ill. 2d [320,] 326-27[, 673 N.E.2d 244, 247, 220 Ill. Dec. 332 (1996)]; People v. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d 243, 246[, 763 N.E.2d 858, 860, 261 Ill. Dec. 609] (2002); Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 759 n.1 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Muzika, 986 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1993) (the existence of a plea agreement is determined by ordinary contract principles of offer and acceptance). Pursuant to traditional principles of contract, the legal effect of a counteroffer is the rejection of a standing offer. Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Deutsche Financial Services Corp., 216 F.3d 388, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2000), citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 36 (1981). A rejected offer cannot be revived by a later acceptance. See Sementa v. Tylman, 230 Ill. App. 3d 701, 705[, 595 N.E.2d 688, 692, 172 Ill. Dec. 327] (1992); D'Agostino v. Bank of Ravenswood, 205 Ill. App. 3d 898, 902[, 563 N.E.2d 886, 889, 150 Ill. Dec. 759] (1990); Sharp Electronics Corp., 216 F.3d ...