The Fourth Amendment, does not set forth some general “particularity requirement” as it specifies only two matters that must be “particularly describ[ed]” in the warrant: “the place to be searched” and “the persons or things to be seized.” The Supreme Court has rejected efforts to expand the scope of this provision to embrace unenumerated matters. In Dalia v. United States, 441 U. S. 238 (1979) , it considered an order authorizing the interception of oral communications by means of a “bug” installed by the police in the petitioner’s office. The petitioner argued that, if a covert entry is necessary to install such a listening device, the authorizing order must “explicitly set forth its approval of such entries before the fact.” Id., at 255. This argument fell before the “ ‘precise and clear’ ” words of the Fourth Amendment: “Nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court’s decisions interpreting that language suggests that, in addition to the [requirements set forth in the text], search warrants also must include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be executed.” Id., at 255 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 481 (1965) ...