When 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 438 (1963); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 403 (1963), substantial; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 444 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 464 (1958), subordinating; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 361 U. S. 524 (1960), paramount; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 323 U. S. 530 (1945); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 406 (1963), cogent; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 361 U. S. 524 (1960), strong; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 408 (1963). Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is ...