The right to free speech, of course, includes the right to attempt to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed simply because the speaker's message may be offensive to his audience. But the protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 487 (1988). Indeed, '[i]t may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate 'verbal or visual assault,' that justifies proscription.' Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 210-211, n. 6 (1975) (citation and brackets omitted). Even in a public forum, one of the reasons we tolerate a protester's right to wear a jacket expressing his opposition to government policy in vulgar language is because offended viewers can 'effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.' Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971).
The recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted communication varies widely in different settings. It is far less important when 'strolling through Central Park' than when 'in the confines of one's own home,' or when persons ...