The prospect of crime by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959) ('Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech') (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). It is also well established that speech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects offending our sensibilities. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978) ('[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it'); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 874 (1997) ('In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that `[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment' ') (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 701 (1977) ('[T]he fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression').