The modern history of the guarantee of freedom of speech and press mainly has been one of a search for the outer limits of that right. From the fountainhead opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Schenck, Abrams, and Whitney, [Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (Holmes, J.); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 250 U. S. 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 274 U. S. 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).] which considered the problem when the disruptive effects of speech might strip the protection from the speaker, to the decision in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, where the court found freedom of speech not to include a freedom to trespass, the Court's primary concern has been to determine the extent of the right and the surrounding safeguards necessary to give it 'breathing space.' 371 U. S. 433. That concern has perhaps omitted from searching consideration the 'real problem' of defining or delimiting the right itself. See Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 467, 471.
It is significant that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press falls between the religious ...