'[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.' 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 103. According the press the ample protection provided by that principle is supported by at least three separate considerations, in addition to, of course, the overarching 'public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.'' Cox Broadcasting, s 420 U. S. 491, quoting Garrison at 379 U. S. 73 (footnote omitted).
When a State attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the small-time disseminator as well as the media giant. Where important First Amendment interests are at stake, the mass scope of disclosure is not an acceptable surrogate for injury. A ban on disclosures effected by 'instrument[s] of mass communication' simply cannot be defended on the ground that partial prohibitions may effect partial relief. See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 104-105 (statute is insufficiently tailored ...