The First Amendment does not bar regulation of the 'collateral consequences' Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.REV. 1, 23 or 'collateral aspects' Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV.L.REV. 1, 5 (1965) of speech. For example, use of public places for speech-related purposes, although a right jealously guarded by the First Amendment, [See, e. g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley ; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972). See generally Kalven, supra.] is subject to reasonable restraints intended to ameliorate traffic congestion, [See, e. g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 85 L. Ed. 1049, 61 S. Ct. 762 (1941). ] reduce noise to tolerable levels, [See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 86, 408 U.S. at 114-121; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 L. Ed. 513, 69 S. Ct. 448 (1949). ] or prevent 'capture' of unwilling audiences. See, e. g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.
To be sure, many cases dealing with the collateral consequences of speech admit of analysis in terms ...