Part of the analysis for a taking requires courts to determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed development. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127 (1978) (' '[A] use restriction may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose' ').
In some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. See, e. g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P. 2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673 (1966). This standard was deemed too lax to adequately protect a petitioner's right to just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose. See Dolan v. City of Tigard 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Other state courts require a very exacting correspondence, described as the 'specifi[c] and uniquely attributable' test. The Supreme Court of Illinois first developed this test in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 ...