Although statutes of limitation provide the 'primary guarantee' against prosecutorial delay, the Supreme Court has explained that 'the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.' United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 2044 (1977). When considering whether the due process clause of the fifth amendment ['No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .' U.S. Const. amend. V. ] requires the dismissal of an indictment on the ground of undue pre-indictment delay, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the defendant must prove that she suffered actual and substantial prejudice. Second, the court must weigh the actual prejudice to the defendant against the government's reasons for the delay. See United States v. Zukowski, 851 F.2d 174, 178-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868, 109 S. Ct. 174, 102 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1988); United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 994-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 839, 109 S. Ct. 106, 102 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1988); United States v. L'Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 238 ...