Under FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) sanctions may not be imposed for the inability to produce electronically stored information lost because of the routine, good-faith operation of a party's computer system. ); Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994); Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1993). '[T]he judge [imposing sanctions] should take pains neither to use an elephant gun to slay a mouse nor to wield a cardboard sword if a dragon looms. Whether deterrence or compensation is the goal, the punishment should be reasonably suited to the crime.' Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990). A measure of the appropriateness of a sanction is whether it 'restore[s] the prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing party.' West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) ('[T]he applicable sanction should be molded to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales underlying the spoliation ...