An applicant's interests are not adequately represented if they diverge sufficiently from the interests of the existing party, such that 'the existing party cannot devote proper attention to the applicant's interests.' United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 520, 60 V.I. 1004 (3d Cir. 2014). This burden is generally 'treated as minimal' and requires the applicant to show 'that representation of his interest 'may be' inadequate.' Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 368, 33 V.I. 311 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10, 92 S. Ct. 630, 30 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1972)).
A rebuttable presumption of adequacy applies 'if one party is a government entity charged by law with representing the interests of the applicant for intervention.' Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d at 520 (citation omitted). But even when the government is a party, '[t]he burden of establishing inadequacy of representation . . . varies with each case.' Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972. For that reason, the presumption is particularly strong when the governmental and private interests 'closely parallel' one another, id., ...