The expressio unius canon operates differently in a review of agency action than it does when we are directly interpreting a statute. See Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 694, 291 U.S. App. D.C. 254 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ('[T]his canon has little force in the administrative setting.'); Cheney R.R. Co. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 69, 284 U.S. App. D.C. 101 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ('Whatever [expressio unius's] general force, we think it an especially feeble helper in an administrative setting, where Congress is presumed to have left to reasonable agency discretion questions that it has not directly resolved.'). In scenarios of precisely this ilk, 'courts have consistently recognized that a congressional mandate in one section and silence in another often suggests not a prohibition but simply a decision not to mandate any solution in the second context, i.e., to leave the question to agency discretion.' Catawba Cnty., N.C. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 36, 387 U.S. App. D.C. 20 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This approach dovetails appropriately with the wide latitude afford agencies when interpreting statutes: courts do not demand the best interpretation, only a reasonable one.