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If a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 206-208; Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 447 U. S. 436-437 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 426 U. S. 810 (1976). 

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra, involved a Maryland program designed to reduce the number of junked automobiles in the State. A 'bounty' was established on Maryland-licensed junk cars, and the State imposed more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state scrap processors than on in-state ones. The Court rejected a Commerce Clause attack on the program, although it noted that, under traditional Commerce Clause analysis, the program might well be invalid because it had the effect of reducing the flow of goods in interstate commerce. Id. at 426 U. S. 805. The Court concluded that Maryland's action was not 'the kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is concerned,' ibid., because '[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence ...

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