If an ordinance does not discriminate against interstate commerce that does not end the Commerce Clause inquiry. Even a nondiscriminatory regulation may nonetheless impose an excessive burden on interstate trade when considered in relation to the local benefits conferred. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573, 579 (1986). The court has long recognized that 'a burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to ... the people of the State enacting such statute.' Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 83 (1891) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, 'the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.' Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
'It is the established doctrine that a state may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden the prosecution of interstate business.' International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 217 U. S. ...