In applying the collateral order doctrine, courts have stressed that it must 'never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.' Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,511 U.S. 863, 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Hallock,546 U.S. 345, 350, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ('emphasizing [the doctrine's] modest scope'). This admonition reflects a healthy respect for the virtues of the final-judgment rule. Permitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, undermines 'efficient judicial administration' and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a 'special role' in managing ongoing litigation. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,449 U.S. 368, 374, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); see also Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller,472 U.S. 424, 436, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) ('[T]he district judge can better exercise [his or her] responsibility [to police the prejudgment tactics of litigants] if the appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment rulings').
The justification for immediate appeal must therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual ...