The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: '[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' Although generally understood to preclude a second prosecution for the same offense, the Court has also interpreted this prohibition to prevent the State from 'punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.' Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 396 (1995) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). If the commitment statute is civil in nature, initiation of its commitment proceedings does not constitute a second prosecution. Cf. Jones v. United States, 463 U. S. 354 (1983) (permitting involuntary civil commitment after verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity). Commitment under such an act is not tantamount to 'punishment,' and subsequent involuntary detention under the act does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though that confinement may follow a prison term. Indeed, in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966), the court expressly recognized that civil commitment could follow the expiration of a prison term without offending double jeopardy principles. The court reasoned that 'there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the ...