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The degree of formality that a hearing must afford does not necessarily turn on the presence or absence of an explicit statutory directive. If, even absent such a directive, the nature of the hearing that Congress intended to grant is clear, then that intention governs. Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 246 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir.2001); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir.1978). Seacoast predates the Supreme Court's watershed decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and that Dantran merely followed Seacoast without assessing its vitality in the post-Chevron era. It seems clear that while the type of hearing required by a statute turns on congressional intent, Chevron adds a new dimension, requiring that the agency's reasonable interpretation be accorded deference if there is any ambiguity as to that intent. See id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. 


The degree of formality that a hearing must afford does not necessarily turn on the presence or absence of an explicit statutory directive. If, even absent such a directive, the nature of the ...

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