Even under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate “within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.” Arlington, 569 U.S., at ___, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 185 L. Ed. 2d 941, 951. And reasonable statutory interpretation must account for both “the specific context in which . . . language is used” and “the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1997). A statutory “provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S. Ct. 626, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1988). Thus, an agency interpretation that is “inconsistent with the design and structure of the statute as a whole,” University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 186 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013), does not merit deference.
An agency has ...