When a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512-13, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341, 94 S. Ct. 1820 (1974); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 121-22, 91 L. Ed. 1375, 67 S. Ct. 1129 (1947); Halverson v. Slater, 327 U.S. App. D.C. 97, 129 F.3d 180, 185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Mango, 199 F.3d 85, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1999); Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587, 592 (10th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 502 U.S. 801, 116 L. Ed. 2d 18, 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991). But the cases recognize an important distinction between subdelegation to a subordinate and subdelegation to an outside party. The presumption that subdelegations are valid absent a showing of contrary congressional intent applies only to the former. There is no such presumption covering subdelegations to outside parties. Indeed, if anything, the case law strongly suggests that subdelegations to outside parties ...