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Technically, only the perpetrator can (and must) manifest the mens rea of the crime committed. Accomplice liability is premised on a different or, more appropriately, an equivalent mens rea. (Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine (1985) 73 Cal.L.Rev. 323, 349, fn. 51 [hereafter cited as Complicity Doctrine].) This equivalence is found in intentionally encouraging or assisting or influencing the nefarious act. '[By] intentionally acting to further the criminal actions of another, the [accomplice] voluntarily identifies himself with the principal party. The intention to further the acts of another, which creates liability under criminal law, may be understood as equivalent to manifesting consent to liability under the civil law.' (Complicity Doctrine, supra, at pp. 354-355; see generally Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 609.) 

Thus, to be a principal to a crime, the conspirator need only intend to agree or conspire and to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy (People v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 296 [115 Cal.Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300]); while the aider and abettor must intend to commit the offense or to encourage or facilitate its commission (People v. Beeman ...

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