Examples to Show How Different and Better Dean's Law Dictionary Has Become.

 The Supreme Court has distinguished between two branches of Takings Clause cases: physical takings and regulatory takings. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1479 (2002) (distinguishing 'between acquisitions of property for public uses . . . and regulations prohibiting private uses') [hereinafter Tahoe-Sierra]; see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522, 118 L. Ed. 2d 153, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (delineating between claims of physical occupation and mere regulation). A physical taking occurs either when there is a condemnation or a physical appropriation of property. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478. Generally, courts apply 'straightforward' per se rules when addressing physical takings. Id. A regulatory taking transpires when some significant restriction is placed upon an owner's use of his property for which 'justice and fairness' require that compensation be given. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987 (1962); accord Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) ('The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if that regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.'). For the most part, courts apply a three-part 'ad hoc, factual inquiry' to evaluate whether a regulatory taking has occurred: (1) what is the economic impact of the regulation; (2) whether the government action interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (3) what is the character of the government action. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. However, the Supreme Court has developed at least one per se rule in the regulatory takings sphere. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1480. When a regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive uses of land, it is a taking. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 


The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897), provides: '[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Fourteenth Amendment does make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 122 (1978); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 827 (1987). Nor is there any doubt that these cases have relied upon Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), to reach that result. See, e. g., Penn Central, supra, at 122 ('The issue presented ... [is] whether the restrictions imposed by New York City's law upon appellants' exploitation of the Terminal site effect a 'taking' of appellants' property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897)'). 


One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). 


On the other side of the ledger, the authority of state and local governments to engage in land use planning has been sustained against constitutional challenge as long ago as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). 'Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922). A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.' Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). 


 The Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960). See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-319, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1987); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-125, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). And “[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 71 S. Ct. 670, 95 L. Ed. 809, 119 Ct. Cl. 851 (1951)). These guides are fundamental in our Takings Clause jurisprudence. Courts have recognized, however, that no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with property is a taking. In view of the nearly infinite variety of ways in which government actions or regulations can affect property interests, the Court has recognized few invariable rules in this area.


Courts have drawn some bright lines, notably, the rule that a permanent physical occupation of property authorized by government is a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982). So, too, is a regulation that permanently requires a property owner to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of his or her land. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992). But aside from the cases attended by rules of this order, most takings claims turn on situation-specific factual inquiries. See Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631.


'The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Courts have recognized that this constitutional guarantee is '''designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'' Penn Central, [438 U. S.], at 123-124 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960)). The concepts of 'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has eschewed 'any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' Penn Central, supra, at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962)). The outcome instead 'depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.'' Penn Central, supra, at 124 (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958)).' Id., at 633. 


While it confirms the state's authority to confiscate private property, the text of the Fifth Amendment imposes two conditions on the exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a 'public use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner. Often referred to as the Just Compensation Clause, the final Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: 'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' It applies to the States as well as the Federal Government. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897). Before moving on to the second condition, the 'just compensation' requirement, courts must address the type of taking, if any, that a case involves. The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private property.


Jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules. Regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,' Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124, designed to allow 'careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.' Palazzolo [v. Rhode Island], 533 U. S. [606,] 636 [2001] (O'Connor, J., concurring).When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 115 (1951), regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the government occupies the property for its own purposes, even though that use is temporary. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 (1945), United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372 (1946). Similarly, when the government appropriates part of a rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982); or when its planes use private airspace to approach a government airport, United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), it is required to pay for that share no matter how small. But a government regulation that merely prohibits landlords from evicting tenants unwilling to pay a higher rent, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); that bans certain private uses of a portion of an owner's property, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470 (1987); or that forbids the private use of certain airspace, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), does not constitute a categorical taking. 'The first category of cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.' Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 523 (1992). See also Loretto, 458 U. S., at 440; Keystone, 480 U. S., at 489, n. 18.' Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 321-323 (2002). 'The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.' Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 194 (1985).


All of the Circuit Judges and District Judges who have confronted the compensation question have agreed that the 'just compensation' required by the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property owner's loss rather than the government's gain. This conclusion is supported by consistent and unambiguous holdings in our cases. Most frequently cited is Justice Holmes' characteristically terse statement that 'the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.' Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195 (1910). Also directly in point is Justice Brandeis' explanation of why a mere technical taking does not give rise to an obligation to pay compensation: 'We have no occasion to determine whether in law the President took possession and assumed control of the Marion & Rye Valley Railway. For even if there was technically a taking, the judgment for defendant was right. Nothing was recoverable as just compensation, because nothing of value was taken from the company; and it was not subjected by the Government to pecuniary loss.' Marion & Rye Valley R. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 280, 282 (1926).


A private party 'is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more.' Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934).In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1 (1949), although there was disagreement within the Court concerning the proper measure of the owner's loss when a leasehold interest was condemned, it was common ground that the government should pay 'not for what it gets but for what the owner loses.' Id., at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Moreover, in his opinion for the majority, Justice Frankfurter made it clear that, given 'the liability of all property to condemnation for the common good,' an owner's nonpecuniary losses attributable to 'his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship.' Id., at 5. In contradiction to this theory of loss imposed upon the owner is the market value theory.


When a State has taken private property for a public use, the Fifth Amendment requires compensation in the amount of the market value of the property on the date it is appropriated. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U. S. 24, 29 (1984) (holding that just compensation is ' 'market value of the property at the time of the taking' ' (emphasis added)) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934)); Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U. S. 1, 10 (1984); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Monroe and Pike County Land, 441 U. S. 506, 511 (1979); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 470, 474 (1973); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U. S. 121, 130 (1950); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 344 (1923).


As explained in United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 377 (1946), 'just compensation ... is not the value to the owner for his particular purposes or to the condemnor for some special use but a so-called 'market value.' ' Our cases have recognized only two situations in which this standard is not to be used: when market value is too difficult to ascertain, and when payment of market value would result in ' 'manifest injustice' ' to the owner or the public. See Kirby Forest Industries, Inc., supra, at 10, n. 14. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155 (1980), which involved a Florida statute that allowed the clerk of a court, in his discretion, to invest interpleader funds deposited with that court in interest-bearing certificates, the interest earned to be deemed ' 'income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court.' ' Id., at 156, n. 1 (quoting Fla. Stat. §28.33 (1977)). The appellant in Webb's had tendered nearly $2 million to a state court after filing an interpleader action, and the court held that the state court's retention of the more than $100,000 in interest generated by those funds was an uncompensated taking of private property. 449 U. S., at 164. 


The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), provides that private property shall not 'be taken for public use, without just compensation.' As its text makes plain, the Takings Clause 'does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.' First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 314 (1987). In other words, it 'is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.' Id., at 315 (emphasis in original). While scholars have offered various justifications for this regime, the Supreme Court has emphasized its role in 'bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 325 (1893).


The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property. See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114 (1951) (Government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 (1945) (Government's occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). Indeed, until the Court's watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), 'it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property, or the functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession.' ' Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citations omitted and emphasis added; brackets in original); see also id., at 1028, n. 15 ('[E]arly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all'). Beginning with Mahon, however, the Court recognized that government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster--and that such 'regulatory takings' may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment. In Justice Holmes' storied but cryptic formulation, 'while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' 260 U. S., at 415.


 The rub, of course, has been--and remains--how to discern how far is 'too far.' 'Government regulation--by definition--involves the adjustment of rights for the public good,' Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65 (1979), and that 'Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,' Mahon, supra, at 413. The precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property--however minor--it must provide just compensation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982) (state law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities in apartment buildings effected a taking). A second categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of 'all economically beneficial us[e]' of her property. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1019 (emphasis in original). The court held in Lucas that the government must pay just compensation for such 'total regulatory takings,' except to the extent that 'background principles of nuisance and property law' independently restrict the owner's intended use of the property. Id., at 1026-1032.


Outside these two relatively narrow categories (and the special context of land-use exactions discussed below, see infra, at 16-18), regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). The Court in Penn Central acknowledged that it had hitherto been 'unable to develop any 'set formula' ' for evaluating regulatory takings claims, but identified 'several factors that have particular significance.' Id., at 124. Primary among those factors are '[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.' Ibid. In addition, the 'character of the governmental action'--for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through 'some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good'--may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred. Ibid.


The Penn Central factors--though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions--have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 617-618 (2001); id., at 632-634 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified. But these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.


Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights. The Court has held that physical takings require compensation because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner's right to exclude others from entering and using her property--perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 831-832 (1987); Loretto, supra, at 433; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979). In the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative factor. See Lucas, supra, at 1017 (positing that 'total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation'). And the Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests. 


The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Clause is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 (1897). The plain language of the Takings Clause “requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose,” see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002), but it does not address in specific terms the imposition of regulatory burdens on private property. Indeed, “[p]rior to Justice Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922), it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner’s possession,” like the permanent flooding of property. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, 398 (2015); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982). Mahon, however, initiated this Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, declaring that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 260 U. S., at 415, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322. A regulation, then, can be so burdensome as to become a taking, yet the Mahon Court did not formulate more detailed guidance for determining when this limit is reached.


In the near century since Mahon, the Court for the most part has refrained from elaborating this principle through definitive rules. This area of the law has been characterized by “ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” Tahoe-Sierra, supra, at 322, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has, however, stated two guidelines relevant here for determining when government regulation is so onerous that it constitutes a taking. First, “with certain qualifications . . . a regulation which ‘denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land’ will require compensation under the Takings Clause.”  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592 (2001) (quoting Lucas, supra, at 1015, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798). Second, when a regulation impedes the use of property without depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use, a taking still may be found based on “a complex of factors,” including (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. Palazzolo, supra, at 617, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978)).


By declaring that the denial of all economically beneficial use of land constitutes a regulatory taking, Lucas stated what it called a “categorical” rule. See 505 U. S., at 1015, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798. Even in Lucas, however, the Court included a caveat recognizing the relevance of state law and land-use customs: The complete deprivation of use will not require compensation if the challenged limitations “inhere . . . in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already placed upon land ownership.” Id., at 1029, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798; see also id., at 1030-1031, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (listing factors for courts to consider in making this determination).


 A central dynamic of the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, then, is its flexibility. This has been and remains a means to reconcile two competing objectives central to regulatory takings doctrine. One is the individual’s right to retain the interests and exercise the freedoms at the core of private property ownership. Cf. id., at 1028, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (“[T]he notion . . . that title is somehow held subject to the ‘implied limitation’ that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture”). Property rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where governments are always eager to do so for them.


The other persisting interest is the government’s well-established power to “adjust rights for the public good.” Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65, 100 S. Ct. 318, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979). As Justice Holmes declared, “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Mahon, supra, at 413, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322. In adjudicating regulatory takings cases a proper balancing of these principles requires a careful inquiry informed by the specifics of the case. In all instances, the analysis must be driven “by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” Palazzolo, supra, at 617-618, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960)).