Examples to Show How Different and Better Dean's Law Dictionary Has Become.

An administrative rule may receive substantial deference if it interprets the issuing agency’s own ambiguous regulation. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-463 (1997). An interpretation of an ambiguous statute may also receive substantial deference. Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984). Deference in accordance with Chevron, however, is warranted only “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001). Otherwise, the interpretation is “entitled to respect” only to the extent it has the “power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).


In determining whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute is lawful, courts apply the two-step Chevron analysis: 1) If Congress “has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” in the text of the statute, the text governs; or 2) If the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” then the court reviews “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Thus, a court must first decide “whether the statute unambiguously forbids the agency’s interpretation,” and if not, “whether the interpretation, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the permissible.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002).


As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Mead Corp., Chevron deference may be warranted “even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.” 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001). Thus, where “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which ‘Congress did not actually have an intent’ as to a particular result,” courts should confer Chevron deference. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845). Even if Chevron does not apply, interpretations contained in formats such as policy statements, agency manuals, guidelines, and opinion letters are still “entitled to respect” and may “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See also Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). “The weight of [the agency’s] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. This deference is justified by the “specialized experience and broader investigations and information available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires.” Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted).


Two Supreme Court cases, Christensen and Mead Corp., illustrate the application of this doctrine. In Mead Corp., the Supreme Court held that a tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service - which did not follow notice and comment - was not entitled to Chevron deference, because the statute authorizing the Customs Service to fix tariff classifications did not indicate that these classification rulings would carry the force of law; the rulings would not necessarily bind more than the parties involved, and every ruling would be subject to independent review by the Court of International Trade. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231-32. However, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the tariff ruling was entitled to respect under Skidmore, noting that the regulatory scheme for tariffs was highly detailed and the Customs Service could bring the benefit of specialized experience. See id. at 235. In Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court refused to defer to the Department of Labor’s opinion letter, which interpreted the Fair Labor Standards Act as barring employers from forcing employees to use compensatory time accrued for overtime work. 529 U.S. at 576. The Court concluded that the agency’s interpretation of the statute was unpersuasive, because both the statutory language and the regulation in question permitted compelled compensatory time. See id. at 586-88.


An agency action qualifies for Chevron deference when Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated to the agency the authority to 'fill' a statutory 'gap,' including an interpretive gap created through an ambiguity in the language of a statute's provisions. Chevron, supra, at 843-844; Mead, supra, at 226-227. The Court said in Mead that such delegation 'may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.' 533 U. S., at 227 (emphasis added). The Court explicitly stated that the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking did 'not decide the case,' for the Court has 'sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.' Id., at 231. And the Court repeated that it 'has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron deference.' Id., at 237.


It is not surprising that the Court would hold that the existence of a formal rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute. It is not a necessary condition because an agency might arrive at an authoritative interpretation of a congressional enactment in other ways. See, e.g., Mead, supra, at 231. It is not a sufficient condition because Congress may have intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency, irrespective of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that interpretation, say, where an unusually basic legal question is at issue. Cf. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 600 (2004) (rejecting agency's answer to question whether age discrimination law forbids discrimination against the relatively young). 


Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law do not warrant Chevron-style deference. See, e. g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 61 (1995) (internal agency guideline, which is not 'subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedur[e] Act, including public notice and comment,' entitled only to 'some deference' (internal quotation marks omitted)); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 256-258 (1991) (interpretative guidelines do not receive Chevron deference); Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U. S. 144, 157 (1991) (interpretative rules and enforcement guidelines are 'not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the Secretary's delegated lawmaking powers'). See generally 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.5 (3d ed. 1994). Instead, interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are 'entitled to respect' under the decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade,' ibid. See Arabian American Oil Co., supra, at 256-258. 


Of course, the framework of deference set forth in Chevron does apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regulation. 


When Congress has 'explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,' p.p1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; } p.p2 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; ; min-height: 14.0px} p.p3 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; ; color: #0070c0} span.s1 {color: #0070c0} span.s2 {color: #000000} lass="s1">Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843-844, and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute. See id., at 844; United States v. Morton, 467 U. S. 822, 834 (1984); APA, 5 U. S. C. §§ 706(2)(A), (D). But whether or not they enjoy any express delegation of authority on a particular question, agencies charged with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices, and while not all of those choices bind judges to follow them, they certainly may influence courts facing questions the agencies have already answered. '[T]he well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,'' Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 139-140), and '[w]e have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's onstruction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer .... ' Chevron, supra, at 844 (footnote omitted); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 565 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978). The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, [ See, e. g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 142 (1976) (courts consider the ''thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration'' (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944))).] its consistency, [See, e. g., Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417 (1993) ('[T]he consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due').] formality, [See, e. g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 61 (1995) (internal agency guideline that is not 'subject to the rigors of the [APA], including public notice and comment,' is entitled only to 'some deference' (internal quotation marks omitted)).] and relative expertness, [See, e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U. S. 380, 390 (1984).] and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position, see Skidmore, supra, at 139-140. The approach has produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one end, see, e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U. S. 380, 389-390 (1984) (' 'substantial deference'' to administrative construction), to near indifference at the other, see, e. g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212-213 (1988) (interpretation advanced for the first time in a litigation brief). Justice Jackson summed things up in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.: 


Since 1984, courts have identified a category of interpretive choices distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference. The Court in Chevron recognized that Congress not only engages in express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that '[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit.' 467 U. S., at 844. Congress, that is, may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which 'Congress did not actually have an intent' as to a particular result. Id., at 845. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency's chosen resolution seems unwise, see id., at 845-846, but is obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's interpretation is reasonable, see id., at 842-845; cf. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2) (a reviewing court shall set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law').


Courts have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed. See, e. g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257 (1991) (no Chevron deference to agency guideline where congressional delegation did not include the power to ''promulgate rules or regulations' ' (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976))); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 596-597 (2000) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (where it is in doubt that Congress actually intended to delegate particular interpretive authority to an agency, Chevron is 'inapplicable'). It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.[See Merrill & Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 872 (2001) ('[I]f Chevron rests on a presumption about congressional intent, then Chevron should apply only where Congress would want Chevron to apply. In delineating the types of delegations of agency authority that trigger Chevron deference, it is therefore important to determine whether a plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a delegation to mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority').]Cf. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 741 (1996) (APA notice and comment 'designed to assure due deliberation'). Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. For rulemaking cases, see, e. g., Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U. S. 1,20-21 (2000); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U. S. 380 (1999); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366 (1999); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U. S. 382 (1998); Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448 (1998); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U. S. 642 (1997); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735 (1996); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687 (1995); ICC v. Transcon Lines, 513 U. S. 138 (1995); PUD No.1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U. S. 700 (1994); Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, supra; American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U. S. 606 (1991); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83 (1990); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U. S. 521 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107 (1989); K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281 (1988); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 154 (1986); United States v. Fulton, 475 U. S. 657 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121 (1985). For adjudication cases, see, e. g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 423-425 (1999); Federal Employees v. Department of Interior, 526 U. S. 86,98-99 (1999); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U. S. 392 (1996); ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U. S. 317, 324-325 (1994); National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U. S. 407, 417-418 (1992); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 128 (1991); Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495 U. S. 641, 644-645 (1990); Department of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA, 494 U. S. 922 (1990).


That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure does not decide the case, for courts have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded, see, e. g., NationsBank of N. c., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 256-257, 263 (1995). n NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S., at 256-257 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court quoted longstanding precedent concluding that '[t]he Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of [the rule of deference] with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.' See also 1 M. Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation § 1.3.1, p. 1.41 (1996) (stating that the Comptroller is given 'personal authority' under the National Bank Act). The fact that rule was not a product of such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron.   p.p1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; } p.p2 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; ; min-height: 14.0px} p.p3 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; ; color: #0070c0} span.s1 {color: #0070c0} span.s2 {color: #000000} p>


The fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through means less formal than 'notice and comment' rulemaking does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due. Cf. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843 (stating, without delineation of means, that the ''power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy'' (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231 (1974))). The opinion in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 (2001), denied the suggestion. Id., at 230-231 ('[T]he want of' notice and comment 'does not decide the case'). Indeed, Mead pointed to instances in which the Court has applied Chevron deference to agency interpretations that did not emerge out of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 533 U. S., at 230-231 (citing NationsBank of N. c., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 256257 (1995)). It indicated that whether a court should give such deference depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue. 533 U. S., at 229-231. And it discussed at length why Chevron did not require deference in the circumstances there present-a discussion that would have been superfluous had the presence or absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking been dispositive. 533 U. S., at 231-234.


 An agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear, see, e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113, 109 S.Ct. 414, 419-420, 102 L.Ed.2d 408 (1988); Chevron, 467 U.S., at 842-843, 104 S.Ct., at 2781-2782.